Takeover Threats and Managerial Myopia
探讨接管压力如何导致管理者为提升当前利润而牺牲长期利益，分析了股东信息不完全、股价低估及接管风险等因素的影响。
This paper examines the familiar argument that takeover pressure can be damaging because it leads managers to sacrifice long-term interests in order to boost current profits. If stockholders are imperfectly informed, temporarily low earnings may cause the stock to become undervalued, increasing the likelihood of a takeover at an unfavorable price; hence the managerial concern with current bottom line. The magnitude of the problem depends on a variety of factors, including the attitudes and beliefs o f shareholders, the extent to which corporate raiders have inside information, and the degree to which managers are concerned with retaining control of their firms.