Capitalist-Worker Conflict and Involuntary Unemployment
构建一个简单模型，分析资本家为削弱工人谈判地位而故意制造非自愿失业，并探讨失业救济金变化对失业水平的影响。
We study a simple model of the determination of the level of employment in which a capitalist decides how many workers to hire, and then bargains over the wage with those whom he hires. If the capitalist hires all the available workers, his position is weak since, in the event of a strike, he is unable to hire strike-breakers; for this reason he chooses to leave some workers ("involuntarily") unemployed. An increase in unemployment benefits which raises the cost of hiring strike-breakers affects the bargaining power of both capitalist and workers; under some conditions it leads to a reduction in unemployment.