Learning and Incentive Problems in Repeated Partnerships
在两期代理模型中分析为风险新项目融资的最优合同，研究双方学习项目质量时代理人不可观测行为对学习过程的影响，并比较长期与短期合同的激励效果。
This paper analyzes optimal contracts for financing risky new projects in a two-period agency model. The principal and t he agent both learn about the project quality, and the agent's unobservable actions affect the learning process. The parties have access to the credit market. Compared to the short-term contracts, the long-term contract induces the agent to work harder (less hard) in period one if his marginal effort in the first period increases (reduces) the value of information. In both cases, the long-term contract enables the parties to learn more about the project type. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.