Why Money Talks and Wealth Whispers: Monetary Uncertainty and Mystique: A Comment
指出Eijffinger等人2000年论文中的两个关键命题可能不成立，其倡导的央行行长偏好不确定性安排被其他无此不确定性的安排所超越，且其建模方式导致对平均货币政策的任意影响，偏好不确定性从不可取。
We demonstrate that in important cases Propositions 3 and 4 in Eijffinger, Hoeberichts, and Schaling (Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, May 2000) may fail. Moreover, their monetary policy delegation arrangement, which advocates that central banker preference uncertainty may be desirable, is dominated by other arrangements without any such uncertainty. Finally, their way of modelling preference uncertainty leads to arbitrary effects on average monetary policy. Without these, preference uncertainty is never desirable