Intergenerational Cultural Transmission as an Evolutionary Game
将Bisin-Verdier代际文化传播模型推广到任意数量文化特质，发现该模型等价于复制动态下的演化博弈，并利用稳定博弈和势博弈结果分析了长期特质分布的稳定性。
We generalize the Bisin-Verdier model of intergenerational transmission to permit an arbitrary number of cultural traits. A key observation—that this model is equivalent to an evolutionary game under replicator dynamics—facilitates our analysis. For two special cases, obtained by restricting the pattern of “cultural distastes” between traits, we demonstrate global stability of the long-run distribution of traits using recent results on stable games and potential games. For the general three-trait case, we show that all three traits survive in the long run only if each trait satisfies an “invasion condition” involving the cultural distaste parameters.