Vertical Targeting and Leakage in Carbon Policy
研究了碳政策中监管点的选择（直接监管污染源、上游或下游）如何影响国内外的排放泄漏，发现直接监管会增加外国排放，而间接监管则减少外国排放，总效果取决于市场弹性。
This paper examines the intersection between two aspects of climate policy design. The first is the point of regulation: should it be placed on pollution sources, carbon-rich inputs, or consumers? The second aspect concerns the external effects of a local climate policy. Leakage occurs when partial regulation results in an increase in emissions in unregulated parts of the economy. Our model demonstrates how directly regulating polluters can increase foreign emissions while indirect regulation (either upstream or downstream of the pollution source) will decrease foreign emissions. The net effect on combined domestic and foreign emissions will depend on market elasticities.