How Do MNCS Vote in Developing Country Elections?
研究了跨国公司如何根据发展中国家选举中的政治商业周期调整投资行为，发现当右翼（左翼）现任者更可能被左翼（右翼）挑战者取代时，跨国公司感知到更高（更低）风险并宣布更少（更多）投资项目。
Research on multinational corporations (MNCS) and host government political risk in developing countries has largely ignored local electoral politics, economic policies, and the MNC investment incentives they may generate. In response, I develop and test a framework for understanding MNC risk and investment behavior based on political business cycle considerations. Analyses of 408 MNC investments worth $199 billion in 18 developing countries holding 35 presidential elections from 1987 through 2000 are consistent with these considerations: MNCS perceive higher (lower) risk and announce fewer (more) investment projects as right-wing (left-wing) incumbents appear more likely to be replaced by left-wing (right-wing) challengers.