The joint effect of government crop insurance and loan programmes on the demand for futures hedging
研究了政府补贴的农作物保险和贷款计划如何影响农民使用期货套期保值的决策，发现贷款计划会替代套期保值，且这种关系受产量水平影响，高贷款率与收入保险组合时投机行为反而能降低风险。
This research re-evaluates producer risk management decisions regarding the choice of forward pricing strategies when governmentally subsidised crop insurance designs and price supports are available. An analytical model is developed to illustrate the substitution of loan programmes for hedging. In particular, we find that this relationship is conditioned on yield levels. Also, a numerical analysis is conducted that incorporates futures prices, basis and yield variability. Three alternative crop insurance designs are evaluated. Optimal futures hedge ratios are derived for expected utility-maximising soybean farmers. Our results suggest that government programme levels profoundly alter the farmer's optimal strategy. We also find that apparently speculative behaviour is risk-minimising when high loan rates and revenue insurance are combined. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.