Minority Protection and Dividend Policy in Finland
研究芬兰法律中的少数股东保护（如少数股利条款）如何影响公司现金股利，发现其对管理层控制优于绝对控股股东，且结合强股东权利与少数股利可降低代理成本。
Abstract This paper highlights some theoretical arguments and empirical results on whether legal‐based minority protection affects corporate cash dividends in Finland. The Company Act in Finland states that shareholders having one tenth of all shares can demand a so‐called minority dividend, which is half of the profit of the fiscal year, yet not more than 8% of the equity. Minority dividend, as in Finland, is rarely used in EU countries. I find, that minority protection is a better influence over managerial control than controlling shareholders having absolute voting power. When there is no controlling shareholder and coalition costs are lowest, minority protection in Finland is better than minority protection in mandatory dividend countries. Combining strong shareholder rights (as in the USA) and minority dividend (as in Finland) could decrease agency costs both vertically and horizontally.