Wage Bargaining and Unemployment Persistence
研究两个假设的失业模型：工资由企业与在职工人谈判决定，失业仅通过影响双方市场前景来影响结果；失业持续时间影响失业者的搜寻行为、技能或企业对其技能的认知。这些模型能解释欧洲过去二十年的失业演变及劳动力市场的周期特征。
This paper looks at models of unemployment which make two central assumptions. The first is that wages are bargained between firms and employed workers, and that unemployment affects the outcome only to the extent that it affects the labor market prospects of either employed workers or of firms. The second is that the duration of unemployment affects either the search behavior or the skills of the unemployed, and/or the perceptions of firms of such skills. It argues that such models may explain not only the evolution of European unemployment over the last two decades--an evolution which triggered their development--but many of the cyclical features of labor markets in general. Copyright 1991 by Ohio State University Press.