Optimal Policy in the Presence of Licensed Technology from Abroad
扩展国际贸易理论，分析进口需向外国支付许可费的技术时，一国如何通过商品贸易税和国内商品税或补贴的组合来最大化国民福利，并指出技术进口可能降低福利上限。
This paper extends the theory of international trade to analyze optimal commercial policy of a country importing technology for which royalties must be paid to foreigners. As the analysis shows, the country can maximize national welfare by combining a tax on international trade in commodities and a domestic commodity-market tax or subsidy, depending, respectively, on whether foreigners are net exporters or importers of the commodity whose technology is licensed internationally. The analysis also demonstrates that the maximum level of national welfare might be lower with than without technological imports, if the country's exportable commodity uses the foreign technology.