Unemployment and Recruitment with Heterogeneous Labor
构建模型分析企业招聘时，因无法区分拒绝工作机会的工人或低生产率工人，导致招聘成本上升或收益下降，进而降低招聘强度、提高均衡失业率。
This paper describes the equilibrium wage distribution and unemployment rate when firms recruit (search for) employees. A model in which firms' inability to distinguish workers who refuse job offers increases their expected recruiting costs, is contrasted with one in which indistinguishable low-productivity workers decrease firms' expected gains from hiring. In both, work force heterogeneity enhances search uncertainty, firms recruit less intensively than otherwise, and so the equilibrium unemployment rate rises. Heterogeneity reflects searchers' incomplete knowledge of desirable trading partners' locations and will likely be a confounding influence and source of unemployment in large economies with imperfectly observable sector-specific shocks.