Trade, Tragedy, and the Commons
构建了一个资源管理理论，内生决定各国逃避公地悲剧的程度，即事实上的产权制度。模型解释了资源管理有效性的跨国和跨资源差异，并预测价格、人口和技术变化会导致管理制度的转变。
We develop a theory of resource management where the degree to which countries escape the tragedy of the commons, and hence the de facto property rights regime, is endogenously determined. Three forces determine success or failure in resource management: the regulator's enforcement power, the extent of harvesting capacity, and the ability of the resource to generate competitive returns without being extinguished. The model can explain heterogeneity across countries and resources in the effectiveness of resource management, and it predicts that changes in prices, population, and technology can cause transitions to better or worse management regimes.