Optimal Membership, Employment, and Income Distribution in Unionized and Labor-Managed Firms
从静态和动态角度分析工会化与劳动管理型企业的就业和收入分配，发现企业行为关键取决于初始成员资格，并进一步在动态框架下探讨最优初始成员资格问题。
This article presents a static and dynamic intertemporal analysis of employment and income distribution in unionized and labor-managed firms. Motivated by theoretical considerations and institutional features of Western trade unions and labor-managed firms, we examine firms in which worker-members share the risk of layoffs by (acting as if) compensating laid-off members. In the static framework we show that, although the firms do not behave perversely, their behavior depends crucially on the initial membership. Since the issue of optimal initial membership has been virtually ignored in the literature, we analyze it next within a dynamic framework.