Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Reply
反驳了Chiappori（1988）关于纳什议价模型实证相关性弱的观点，指出该模型能系统解释家庭外部机会对内部资源分配的影响，扩展了新古典需求理论的应用范围。
Pierre-Andre Chiappori's (1988) claim that the Nash-bargaining model is of "weak empirical relevance" and "neither convenient nor really restrictive" is incorrect. Nash-bargained household behavior implies a rich set of empirical implications extending well beyond the Pareto efficiency of intrafamily distributions. By systematically accounting for the impact of opportunities outside the family on resource distribution within the family, Nash-bargained demand theory considerably expands the scope of neoclassical demand theory. Such expansion can elucidate issues ranging from the impact of alimony and child support laws in developed societies to the intrafamily distribution of nutrition in less developed countries. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.