Government Intervention in Imperfectly Competitive Agricultural Input Markets
从理论上论证了在化肥市场存在不完全竞争时，政府征收进口关税的合理性，并比较了单独使用关税、纠正竞争扭曲以及两者并用三种政策的效果，还分析了行业结构变化对最优政策的影响。
Abstract The frequent demands for protection by the fertilizer industry in many developed countries may have important implications for the agricultural sector. This paper provides a theoretical justification for government intervention in the fertilizer market in the form of an import tariff against foreign competitors. However, a superior policy would be for the government to counter the competitive distortion that exists in the market. An even better outcome is attained by using both policies simultaneously. Moreover, since the fertilizer industry undergoes continuous structural change, the extent to which optimal policies should vary is also investigated.