Storable Good Monopoly: The Role of Commitment
研究需求随时间变化时，可储存商品的垄断定价问题，发现若垄断者无法承诺，则各期价格更高、社会福利更低，与科斯猜想结论相反。
We study dynamic monopoly pricing of storable goods in an environment where demand changes over time. The literature on durables has focused on incentives to delay purchases. Our analysis focuses on a different intertemporal demand incentive. The key force on the consumer side is advance purchases or stockpiling. In the case of storable goods, the stockpiling motive has recently been documented empirically. We show that, in this environment, if the monopolist cannot commit, then prices are higher in all periods, and social welfare is lower, than in the case in which the monopolist can commit. This is in contrast with the analysis in the literature on the Coase conjecture.