Investment Bank Reputation, Information Production, and Financial Intermediation
构建模型研究投资银行在股票市场中的声誉获取过程，分析其评估标准、声誉、承销费用与市场价值的内生决定，以及企业家选择承销或直接发行股票的行为。
ABSTRACT We model reputation acquisition by investment banks in the equity market. Entrepreneurs sell shares in an asymmetrically informed equity market, either directly, or using an investment bank. Investment banks, who interact repeatedly with the equity market, evaluate entrepreneurs' projects and report to investors, in return for a fee. Setting strict evaluation standards (unobservable to investors) is costly for investment banks, inducing moral hazard. Investment banks' credibility therefore depends on their equity‐marketing history. Investment banks' evaluation standards, their reputations, underwriter compensation, the market value of equity sold, and entrepreneurs' choice between underwritten and nonunderwritten equity issues emerge endogenously.