The Soviet‐American Grain Agreement and the National Interest
分析1970年代苏联作为谷物进口大国，其国家贸易垄断可能带来的议价优势，并论证苏美谷物协定如何削弱这种优势，使美国可能反过来利用苏联。
Abstract In the 1970s the Soviet Union became a major importer of grain, giving rise to fears that it could extract an undue share of the gains from East‐West trade through the monopsonistic power of its state‐trading organs and by keeping its buying intentions secret. Offer curves depicting Soviet trade are constructed using two alternative characterizations of Soviet trade decision making. We show that the grain agreement between the two countries negates most of the bargaining advantage attributed to the Soviet trade monopoly and may open the Soviet Union to exploitation by the United States.