Stock Repurchases and Executive Compensation Contract Design: The Role of Earnings per Share Performance Conditions
研究发现，高管薪酬合同中包含每股收益业绩条件的公司更可能进行股票回购，且这种关联对股东有净收益，如增加总支付、减少异常应计等。
ABSTRACT: We examine the link between firms’ stock repurchase activity and the presence of earnings per share (EPS) performance conditions in executive compensation contracts. Findings reveal a strong positive association between repurchases and EPS-contingent compensation arrangements. Further analysis suggests net benefits to shareholders from this association. Specifically, repurchasers experience larger increases in total payouts; the positive association between repurchases and cash performance is more pronounced for firms with EPS targets in the presence of surplus cash; undervalued firms with EPS targets are more likely to signal mispricing through a repurchase; and repurchasers with EPS conditions are associated with lower abnormal accruals. We find no evidence that EPS-driven repurchases impose costs on shareholders in the form of investment myopia.