AN ANALYSIS OF THE TIC CRITERION FOR ACCEPTING TAX‐EXEMPT BOND BIDS UNDER CERTAINTY
分析了免税债券市场中TIC标准在投标选择中的偏差，证明在确定性条件下，TIC可能导致发行人选择利息成本现值更高的投标。
ABSTRACT Several analysts have advocated the TIC criterion for the selection of bids in the tax‐free bond market. The proponents, however, have overlooked the bias introduced by the TIC method. An analysis is developed which shows that use of TIC can result in economically incorrect rankings for the issuer. We prove, under conditions of certainty, that given any Bid A, it is possible to construct Bid B with coupon rates arbitrarily close to Bid A such that the TIC criterion leads to acceptance of the bid with the higher present value of interest costs.