Should Central Banks Burst Bubbles? Some Microeconomic Issues
在一个有限期的“更大傻瓜”泡沫模型中，研究央行通过披露信息来压低资产价格的政策效果，发现除非央行拥有信息优势，否则刺破泡沫的规则可能适得其反。
Anti‐bubble policy is examined in a finite‐horizon 'greater fool' bubble model, with rational agents, asymmetric information and short‐sales constraints. This permits the use of standard tools of welfare economics to analyse bubble policies. Policy is modelled as deflating overpriced assets by revealing information about this overpricing. If the central bank is following such a policy, then the market interprets inaction as an implicit endorsement of asset prices, which raises these prices. Also, the central bank can deflate overpriced assets even if it has no informational advantage over any investors about this overpricing. However, unless it has such an informational advantage, a bubble‐bursting rule may only make things worse.