Insurance and Labor Market Contracting: An Analysis of the Capital Market Assumption
探讨保险在劳动力市场契约中的作用，指出资本市场不完美通常不会导致工人完全无法借贷，而是介于无借贷和完美资本市场之间，并分析这种中间假设对企业通过劳动合同提供保险的影响。
In recent years a large literature has developed that investigates the role of insurance in labor market contracting. Papers in this literature typically assume that workers are completely restricted from borrowing. The authors argue, and to some extent demonstrate, that in many environments capital market imperfections do not lead to a no-borrowing result, rather to a capital market assumption intermediate between the no-borrowing assumption and the perfect capital market assumptions. The authors consider some of the ramifications that this intermediate capital market assumption has on the type of insurance firms provide through the labor market contract. Copyright 1986 by University of Chicago Press.