Quality Differentials and Prices: Are Cherries Lemons?
研究了在阿克洛夫柠檬市场中，当不同质量的樱桃按同一标准销售时，卖家特征如何向买家传递质量信号，从而避免低质量产品驱逐高质量产品。
In G. A. Akerlof's market for lemons, goods of differential qualities sell under the same standard. If no price differentials exist, then the low quality goods drive out the high quality goods. In cherry markets, heterogeneous lots of cherries sell within the same market standard. At the time of sale, buyers know only the market standard. Since different qualities sell under the same standard, the potential for lemons exists if buyers cannot identify different qualities. The authors' theoretical and empirical models suggest seller characteristics signal quality to buyers, and buyers pay premiums to firms with these characteristics. Thus, cherries are not lemons. Copyright 1991 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.