Bargaining without a Common Prior-An Immediate Agreement Theorem
分析玩家对未来谁出价持不同信念的序贯讨价还价模型，发现即使过度乐观可能导致延迟，但只要玩家对未来足够乐观且持久，均衡中仍会立即达成协议。
In sequential bargaining models without outside options, each player's bargaining power is ultimately determined by which player will make an offer and when. This paper analyzes a sequential bargaining model in which players may hold different beliefs about which player will make an offer and when. Excessive optimism about making offers in the future can cause delays in agreement. The main result states that, despite this, if players will remain sufficiently optimistic for a sufficiently long future, then in equilibrium they will agree immediately. This result is also extended to other canonical models of optimism.