Price versus Quantity Rules in Dynamic Competition: The Case of Nonrenewable Natural Resources
在不可再生自然资源双寡头的动态博弈框架下比较价格竞争与数量竞争，发现当资源为互补品时价格决策规则占优，为替代品时数量决策规则占优，该结论在子博弈完美均衡下成立。
Price and quantity competition are compared in the dynamic game framework of a nonrenewable natural resource duopoly. It is shown that a price-decision-rule (quantity-decision-rule) strategy dominates, in terms of a higher present value of the initial resource stocks, if the resources are complements (substitutes). This result is shown to hold for subgame-perfect equilibria. It holds although equilibrium price paths resulting from those two types of strategies will cross. It is shown, however, that even though the price trajectories cross, initial equilibrium prices resulting from the price-rule strategy will be lower than the initial equilibrium prices resulting from the quantity-rule strategy. Copyright 1990 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.