Seigniorage, Operating Rules and the High Inflation Trap
研究政府通过印钞融资时，高通胀和低通胀两种均衡并存的现象，分析不同预期假设下均衡的稳定性，并探讨名义锚如何消除双重均衡。
A given amount of seigniorage revenue can be collected at either a high or a low rate of inflation. Thus there ray be two equilibria when a government finances its deficit by printing money--implying that an economy may be stuck in a high inflation equilibrium when, with the same fiscal policy, it could be at a lower inflation rate. We show that under rational expectations the high inflation equilibrium is stable and the low inflation equilibrium unstable; under adaptive expectations or lagged adjustment of money balances with rational expectations, it may be the low inflation equilibrium that is stable. Extending the model to allow for bond as well as money financing of deficits, we show that one of the equilibria disappears if the government sets a nominal anchor for the economy, for instance by fixing the growth rate of money. The dual equilibria and their stability.