Money, Bargaining, and Risk Sharing
研究了货币作为自我保险工具和支付手段的双重角色，在完美风险分担不可行时，通过状态依赖的通货膨胀率改善中央市场的自我保险能力，进而优化分散市场的交易条件，并刻画最优货币政策。
We investigate the dual role of money as a self‐insurance device and a means of payment when perfect risk sharing is not possible, and when the two roles of money are disentangled. We use a variant of Lagos–Wright (2005) where agents face a risk in the centralized market (CM): in the decentralized market (DM) money’s main role is as a means of payment, while in the CM it is as a self‐insurance device. We show that state‐contingent inflation rates can improve agents’ ability to self‐insure in the CM, thereby improving the terms of trade in the DM. We then characterize the optimal monetary policy.