Rescheduling of Sovereign Debt: Forgiveness, Precommitment, and New Money
分析主权债务重新安排中债务减免与新贷款的利弊，讨论如何通过减免和承诺机制解决债务积压问题，对研究债务危机和国际金融的学者有参考价值。
to meet contractual obligations on their external debt. Lenders generally responded by rescheduling these debts rather than declaring them to be in default, but further commercial lending to these sovereigns has virtually ceased. These borrowers now face an enormous debt overhang, while their lenders face substantial losses on their international loan portfolios. Among the many proposals for addressing this crisis, the relative desirability of debt forgiveness and new lending has been the focus of considerable debate. The Baker plan of 1985 emphasized additional funding coupled with growth-oriented domestic policies rather than debt reduction. Lenders were encouraged to provide additional funds (new money) to help the impaired and indebted economies grow their way back to creditworthiness. However, lenders were reluctant to offer new funds that would increase the sovereign's debt burden without some assurance that future repayment would be likely. With debt generally recognized as providing borrowers with a disincentive for investment, 1 the emphasis has now shifted to the need for debt forgiveness on the part of the lenders and a commitment to internal adjustment by the borrowers. Both parties are viewed as benefitting by a reduction of the inherited debt, and possibly the provision of additional funds, if the sovereign borrower can commit itself to adopting policies that reduce internal consumption and