Ratification Requirement and Bargaining Power
研究大型群体如何通过设定超多数批准规则来提升其代理人在议价中的谈判地位，从而获得更大份额的剩余，但同时也面临有益协议被少数否决的风险。
When a large group of people is affected by a bargaining outcome, practical reasons often require that the group be represented by an agent in the bargaining. This paper addresses the issue of how the group ensures that the agent reaches an agreement that satisfies the group. The authors show that, by adopting a super-majority ratification rule, the group may improve its bargaining position and obtain a larger share of the bargaining surplus. However, a super-majority ratification rule also involves the risk that a beneficial agreement is rejected by a minority of the group. Copyright 1997 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.