Take or Leave? Distribution in Asymmetric One‐Off Conflict
指出传统对称博弈模型（如囚徒困境）对分配冲突的解释存在偏差，提出非对称博弈新范式，并通过数值分析和探索性实验研究基本分配冲突。
Summary Most social scientists' views of conflict and cooperation in society are shaped by very elementary, one‐off, two by two symmetric simultaneous move games like prisoner's dilemma, chicken, assurance or stag hunt. We think that this diet of examples leads to biased accounts in particular of distributional conflict, and therefore suggest that asymmetry in payoffs and move structure be taken into account systematically. In this paper a new paradigm of asymmetric games to study basic distributional conflicts is introduced, illustrated numerically and discussed theoretically. The results of exploratory experiments on the empirical side of the matter are also reported.