Compensation Policy and Worker Performance: Identifying Incentive Effects from Field Experiments
探讨如何利用实地实验评估薪酬政策对工人生产力的影响，指出实验虽能解决内生性问题，但需结合结构参数才能预测永久政策变化的效果。
The role of field experiments in evaluating the effect of compensation policies on worker productivity is considered. Particular attention is paid to the ability of a field experiment to identify the effect of a permanent change in firm policy. While field experiments solve endogeneity problems through randomization, they do so within a specific, and at times artificial, environment that may not be replicated by a permanent policy change. As such, rather than providing a basis for the unrestricted identification of incentive effects, experiments are better thought of as providing exogenous variation with which to identify structural parameters. These parameters can, in turn, be used to predict the effects of policy changes.