Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values
分析了同时包含私人价值和共同价值的拍卖中投标者的均衡投标行为，发现共同价值的不确定性会降低效率，而卖家提供信息或增加投标人数能提高效率和收入。
The objects for sale in most auctions possess both private and common value elements. This salient feature has not yet been incorporated into a strategic analysis of equilibrium bidding behaviour. This paper reports such an analysis for a stylised model in which bidders receive a private value signal and an independent common value signal. We show that more uncertainty about the common value has a negative effect on efficiency. Information provided by the seller decreases uncertainty, which raises efficiency and seller's revenues. Efficiency and revenues are also higher when more bidders enter the auction.