Bankruptcy Priority for Bank Deposits: A Contract Theoretic Explanation
用契约理论解释为何多国立法赋予银行存款破产优先权，认为在存在签约成本时，优先权规则能减少信息收集浪费、提高融资效率，尤其对银行业而言，法律标准化优于双边私人安排。
Over the past decade several countries, including the US, have introduced or redesigned legislation that confers priority in bankruptcy upon all or some bank deposits. We argue that in the presence of contracting costs such rules can increase efficiency. We first show in a private information model that a borrower can reduce overall costs of finance by letting informationally heterogeneous lenders choose between junior and senior debt. In particular, we find that debt priorities reduce socially wasteful information gathering by investors. We then argue why, particularly in banking, legal standardization of debt priorities may be superior to bilateral private arrangements.