On the Allocation of Possible EU Total Allowable Catches (TAC) for the Mediterranean Swordfish: An Envy‐Free Criterion and Equitable Procedure
研究欧盟如何与ICCAT国家谈判后，通过破产和负担分担方法公平分配地中海剑鱼捕捞配额，并用无嫉妒指数达成成员国间的最佳妥协方案。
Abstract This paper examines the allocation of entitlement rights for the management of common property resources. In particular, the case of allocating a Total Allowable Catch quota for the M editerranean swordfish is examined as a case study. The proposed approach comprises three steps. First, there is a bargaining procedure between the E uropean U nion ( EU ) and the rest of the I nternational C ommission for the C onservation of A tlantic T unas ( ICCAT ) countries. As soon as an initial agreement is possible, the EU considers various equitable rationing methods to allocate its share to the E uropean M ember S tates. These rationing methods draw upon two different streams of the literature, bankruptcy and ‘burden sharing’. Finally, the E uropean M ember S tates reach a fair agreement through minimising an envy‐free index. The allocation rule which is defined as the weighted average of equal proportion and equal share rationales represents the best compromise solution.