Delays in Renewal of Labor Contracts: Theory and Evidence
构建理论模型解释劳动合同到期后新合同签署延迟的宏观因素，强调名义与实际冲击及不确定性的作用，并用以色列集体工资协议数据验证，发现名义不确定性延长延迟，实际不确定性缩短延迟，且公共部门影响较小。
In many countries, an expired labor contract is automatically extended during the often-protracted delay before the new contract is signed. Our theoretical model focuses on macroeconomic factors in explaining the delay. It emphasizes the importance of the realized nominal and real shocks, and of the levels of nominal and real uncertainty. The model is tested using Israeli collective wage agreements where long delays are frequent. The empirical findings strongly support the theoretical model. Thus, nominal uncertainty is found to increase the delay, and real uncertainty to decrease the delay, but less in the public than in the private sector.