Do Formulas Reduce Political Influence on Intergovernmental Grants? Evidence from Tanzania
研究坦桑尼亚用公式分配政府间拨款是否削弱了议会代表权不均对拨款的影响，发现公式并未显著改变这一效应，对政策制定有重要启示。
Abstract Sub-national governments usually depend on the central government for a large share of their revenues. Therefore, a fair allocation of intergovernmental grants is essential for financing vital local services like education and healthcare. In Tanzania, and many other countries, regions that are better represented in the national parliament receive significantly more funds than others. Recently, Tanzania replaced the previously existing discretionary method of grant allocation by allocation formulas. We study whether this has reduced the effect of malapportionment on grant allocation. Surprisingly, we find that formula allocation does not significantly change this effect. This has important policy implications.