Costly Information Production Equilibria in the Bank Credit Market with Applications to Credit Rationing
研究银行信贷市场中，借款人知道自身违约风险但银行需付费才能获知该信息时，追求利润最大化的银行如何影响信贷价格和数量，并解释信贷配给现象。
In this paper we explore the nature of equilibria in an asymmetrically informed bank credit market in which credit applicants know their own (intrinsic) default risks, but potential lenders can discover these default risks only by expending resources to produce information. The resolution of informational asymmetries in the capital market is, in the contemporary view, considered a very import function served by financial intermediaries like commercial banks and, in the opinion of some, even the primary justification for their existence. We, therefore, focus on how the presence of asymmetrice information--in particular, the response of (expected) profit-maximizing banks to it--affects the equilibrium prices and quantities of credit offered in the banking system.