The Impact of Debt Levels and Debt Maturity on Inflation
研究了政府债务水平和期限结构对最优通货膨胀的影响，发现协调政策下高债务推高通胀、长期限使通胀更持久，而独立央行下通胀更高、更波动且更持久。
We examine the implications for optimal inflation of changes in the level and maturity of government debt under the assumption where fiscal and monetary policies co-ordinate, and in the case of an independent central bank following a Taylor rule. Under co-ordination, inflation persistence and volatility depend on the sign, size and maturity of debt. Higher debt leads to higher inflation and longer maturity leads to more persistent inflation although inflation plays a minor role in achieving fiscal sustainability. Under an independent monetary authority, inflation is higher, more volatile and more persistent and plays a significant role in achieving fiscal solvency. The Economic Journal © 2013 Royal Economic Society.