Land Market Imperfections and Agricultural Policy Impacts in the New EU Member States: A Partial Equilibrium Analysis
分析欧盟新东部成员国土地市场中的交易成本和不完全竞争如何影响农业补贴的福利效果，发现补贴收益最终流向土地所有者，小佃农可能受损，而脱钩支付虽将政策租金转移给农民但限制了提高生产力的结构调整。
This article analyses how transaction costs and imperfect competition in the land market affect the welfare effects of agricultural subsidies in the new Eastern Member States of the European Union. Benefits of land subsidies end up with landowners in new Eastern Member States also with imperfections in the new Eastern Member States land markets. With unequal access to subsidies, small tenant farmers may even lose out from the subsidies. Decoupling of payments shifts policy rents to farmers, but constrains productivity‐enhancing restructuring. Using reserve entitlements to mitigate this effect reduces the intended benefits on distortions and target efficiency.