Changing One's Mind when the Facts Change: Incentives of Experts and the Design of Reporting Protocols
研究委托人如何设计报告协议以从专家处获取最多信息，发现当聪明专家学习更快时，前后不一致的报告反而能显示能力；若委托人决策对信息高度敏感，则顺序报告更优。
Experts often collect and report information over time. What reporting protocol elicits the most information? Here, a principal receives reports sequentially from an agent with privately known ability, who observes two signals about the state of the world. The signals differ in initial quality and, unlike previous work, differ in quality improvement. The paper finds that “mind changes” (inconsistent reports) can signal talent if a smart agent improves faster. Also, sequential reports dominate when the principal's decision is very sensitive to information; a single report dominates if the mediocre agent's signals improve faster or the agent is likely mediocre. Copyright 2007, Wiley-Blackwell.