Incentives for Protecting Farm Workers from Pesticides
建模了三种监管激励体系（侵权责任、工伤保险和行政罚款）对农民保护农场工人免受农药危害的影响，发现工伤保险可能提供更有效的激励，但所有惩罚力度可能都不足以显著影响农民的合规决策。
Abstract Three regulatory incentive systems that may induce farmers to protect farmworkers from pesticide‐related harm are modeled: ex post regulation via tort liability and workers' compensation systems, respectively. and ex ante regulation (fines) by administrative agencies. An empirical application examines the farmer's decision whether to comply with required precautions as well as penalties for noncompliance. Results indicate tort liability and administrative agency regulation, as practiced, provide relatively insignificant incentives, while a workers' compensation system, if fully experiencerated, may offer a more effective incentive. Nevertheless, penalties in all cases may be too small overall to have much influence on farmers' compliance decisions.