Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines: Should the Penalty Fit the Crime?
指出，在司法系统采用“排除合理怀疑”标准时，罚款与定罪概率并非独立；提高罚款会降低定罪概率，因此统一最高罚款可能反而鼓励犯罪，最优罚款应随罪行严重程度递增。
Models of the enforcement-compliance relationship have assumed that both the probability and magnitude of fines are independent choice variables of policy makers. These models indicate that it may be optimal to monitor with lowfrequency but to inflict uniformly maximal penalties for all infractions detected. This article shows that if the judicial system is built on the test, then the penalty and the probability of conviction are not independent. In particular, as the penalty increases, the probability of conviction falls. As a result, uniformly maximal penalties may actually encourage crime rather than deter it. This article shows that optimal fines should rise with the severity of the infraction, that is, the penalty should 'fit the * Models of the enforcement-compliance relationship generally treat both the probability and magnitude of fines as independent choice variables of the government. This approach has led Becker ( 1968) and others' to conclude that it is optimal to set uniformly maximal penalties for all crimes, and to set the probability of conviction at the minimum level necessary to enforce compliance with the law. While this normative prescription is natural and intuitive, there still remains a larger positive question of why in most nations of the world penalties are not uniformly high, but rather rise with the severity of the crime. One possible resolution of the positive and normative questions may lie in the fact that penalties and probabilities of conviction are not generally independent. Convictions are typically determined by judges or jurors who are instructed to convict only if the evidence convinces them beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. Psychologists, however, have found that a juror's willingness to convict may be influenced by more than just the evidence. Jurors are very sensitive to the potential penalties that defendants may pay,