Trade Unions and the Efficiency of the Natural Rate of Unemployment
研究在搜索均衡模型中，分散化工资设定因忽略匹配概率的依赖性而低效，风险中性的垄断工会能否内化这一外部性。发现仅当失业者决定工会政策时才能内化，否则工资和失业率过高，并提出了税收与补贴的纠正方案。
Decentralized wage setting in search equilibrium models is inefficient because the meeting firm and worker ignore the dependence of jobmatching probabilities on the number of firms and workers engaged in search. This paper investigates whether risk-neutral monopolistic unions will have an incentive to internalize this externality. I find that the externality will be internalized only if the union's policy is chosen by unemployed persons. If employed persons influence union policy, both the union wage and unemployment will be too high. A tax on the union wage combined with an employment subsidy to firms can correct this inefficiency.