A Theory of Exit in Duopoly
构建了一个双寡头模型，企业因固定成本或机会成本而退出市场，且退出时间是唯一战略变量，与经典消耗战不同，该模型存在唯一均衡。
We develop a duopoly model in which exit occurs because of the existence of fixed costs or opportunity costs. Each firm enters the market knowing its own cost, but not that of its opponent. As times goes on, each firm becomes increasingly pessimistic about the cost of its remaining rival. The time of exit is the only strategic variable, so that our model is a of attrition. In contrast to the classic war of attrition, however, we assume that with positive probability each firm's costs may be low enough that staying in forever is a dominant strategy. Thus our model, unlike the classic one, has a unique equilibrium.