Unions and Cooperative Behavior: The Effect of Discounting
利用工会合同和行业工资调查数据，研究折现如何影响工会与企业的合作谈判行为，发现行业失败率（折现率代理变量）对合作有负面影响，且对工会企业影响更大。
Using union contract and industry wage survey data, this article examines the effect of discounting on cooperative bargaining behavior by unions and firms. Game theory predicts that higher discount rates raise the temptation to defect from cooperation. Measures of cooperative behavior include the presence of merit pay, incentive pay, wage-employment guarantees, or labor-management study committees. Discount rates are proxied by the relevant industry's failure rate. Failure rates generally had negative effects on cooperation. Industy Wage Survey results showed larger effects for union than nonunion establishments, providing support for the union bargaining framework. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.