Unionism in a Competitive Industry
构建模型分析工会与竞争性工人、企业和消费者之间的互动，探讨垄断型工会和效率型工会的不同覆盖情况及其对工资、就业和产品需求敏感性的影响。
This article explores a model in which a union confronts many competitive workers, firms, and consumers. Under "monopoly" unionism, union coverage may be incomplete; then, union wages and employment are insensitive to product demand variation. Under "efficient" unionism, coverage can never be incomplete; some union variables necessarily vary with product demand. Preliminary evidence on the demand independence under the incomplete coverage hypothesis is presented. Also, more structure is imposed and further hypotheses are derived, and the manner in which the model can be enriched to allow for a variety of union-related issues within a consistent framework is set out. Copyright 1992 by University of Chicago Press.