Interregional Redistribution and Mobility in Federations: A Positive Approach
研究了居民流动时区域间再分配的效果与决定因素，发现再分配导致区域政策与人均收入分化，但可能促进区域内人际平等，投票者可能有意选择这种制度。
The paper studies the effects and the determinants of interregional redistribution in a model of residential and political choice. We find that paradoxical consequences of interjurisdictional transfers arise if people are mobile: while self-sufficient regions are necessarily identical with respect to policies and average incomes in our model, interregional redistribution always leads to the divergence of regional policies and per capita incomes. Thus, interregional redistribution prevents inter<it>regional</it> equality. At the same time, however, transfers may allow for more inter<it>personal</it> equality among the inhabitants of each region. The voting population may therefore in a decision over the fiscal constitution deliberately implement such a transfer scheme to foster regional divergence. Empirical evidence from panel data from OECD countries and Canadian provinces is consistent with the theory.