Does Client Importance Affect Auditor Independence at the Office Level? Empirical Evidence from Going‐Concern Opinions*
研究审计事务所分所层面客户重要性对审计师独立性的影响，发现萨班斯-奥克斯利法案实施后，更重要的客户反而更可能收到持续经营审计意见，缓解了对独立性受损的担忧。
This paper investigates whether client importance affects auditor independence within the local offices of audit firms. Client importance is measured as the proportion of audit fees, non-audit service fees, or total fees that a distressed, public client contributes to the total public-client revenue earned by the individual audit offices. Auditor independence is measured as the auditor's propensity to issue a going-concern opinion. The paper focuses on changes in the relation between fee ratios and auditor reporting decisions from the pre-SOX (2001) to post-SOX (2003) period. In the pre-SOX period, I do not find statistically significant association between any of the fee ratios and the auditor's propensity to issue a going concern opinion. However, in the post-SOX period, I find evidence that higher audit fee and total fee ratios are positively associated with the auditor's propensity to issue a going concern opinion. That is, post-SOX, relatively more important clients are more likely to receive a going concern opinion. These results allay concerns that auditor independence is compromised for significant clients.