Related Lending and Economic Performance: Evidence from Mexico
研究了关联贷款在发展中国家是否必然导致银行掠夺和信贷错配，以墨西哥1888-1913年银行业为例，发现关联贷款未必导致信贷错配，其影响取决于制度环境。
Related lending, a widespread practice in LDCs, is widely held to encourage bankers to loot their banks at the expense of minority shareholders and depositors. We argue that neither looting nor credit misallocation are necessary outcomes of related lending. On the contrary, related lending often exists as a response to high information and contract-enforcement costs. Whether it encourages looting depends on other institutions, particularly those that create incentives to monitor directors. We examine Mexico's banking system, 1888–1913, in which there was widespread related lending. We find little evidence of credit misallocation, despite a financial crisis and government-organized rescue.